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Modem moral
moral philosophy has
has devoted itself primarly
and
primarly to axiological
axiological and
matters. 1 There
deontological
deontological matters.'
There have been occasional
occasional stirrings-some
stirrings-some
2 but it is
recently-in
direction of what might be called
recently-in the direction
called agent-theory,
agent-theory,2
undeniable that ends, means, utility, values, rules, principles, duties, obligaforefront of discussion.
tions, responsibilities, and
and desert have been in the forefront
remains generally
Virtue has
has been and
and remains
as a
generally neglected, or discussed merely as
derivative
derivative concept.
I want to make
make a plea
plea for
for virtue-much
virtue-much in the spirit of Austin's plea for
for
has
excuses-as
moral theorizing.
theorizing. This has
excuses-as a concept which should be central
central to moral
before, 3 but it is clear
philosophers in general
been done before,3
clear that philosophers
general either still need
more developed apologia
convincing or need a more
has yet been provided.
provided. I
apologia than has
thiss paper
Hollins College Seminar in
*A shorter version of thi
paper was presented to the Hollins
February 1974,
Philosophy, February
1974, and
and to the Western
Western Division of the American Philosophical
Philosophical Association, April 1974.
1974.
1. A note on terminology: I use 'axiology'
'axiology' to indicate
1.
indicate the tendency to take
take concepts of value
value
moral theory and
and to ultimately decide (if not redefine)
to be primary
primary (if not primitive)
primitive) in moral
redefine)
and virtue
value questions. 'Deontology' I use to indicate
questions of duty and
virtue in terms
terms of value
indicate the
take concepts of duty and
and obligation as
as primary. These two approaches
approaches to moral
tendency to take
moral
'act theory' or 'act
'act morality'
theory I occasiQnally
under the rubric
rubric 'act
morality' because
because they
occasionally lump together under
have a common focus on acts.
acts. 'Agent-theory,' 'agent-morality,'
'agent-morality,' 'a
'a virtues-vices
virtues-vices approach,'
approach,' and
and
'virtue' I use to indicate
sometimes just 'virtue'
indicate the tendency to ascribe
moral theory
ascribe the central
central place
place in moral
to concepts of virtue, vice, and
person.
and the good person.
2. For recent writings, one may begin with John Rawls's
Rawls's "Outline of a Decision Procedure
Procedure
Philosophical Review
Review 60
(1951): 177-97. There is also, of course, G. E.
E . M. Anscombe's
for Ethics," Philosophical
for
60(1951):
polemic against
against "law-type ethics"
ethics" in "Modem
"Modern Moral
Philosophy," Philosophy
Moral Philosophy,"
Philosoplry 33
33 (1958):
(1958): 1-19.
an issue on virtue
The Monist
Monist did an
virtue in 1970, and
Philosopher's Index
Index lists over fifty articles
and the Philosopher's
articles on
virtue
at the articles
articles themselves reveals
are
virtue for
for the period
period 1967-73. But a look at
reveals that most of them are
analyses of earlier
earlier theorists'
theorists' views on virtue
and that
that only a handful
handful are
are prepared
grant any
virtue and
prepared to grant
analyses
primacy
all to a virtues-vices
approach to moral
primacy at all
virtues-vices approach
moral theory. Those of particular
particular value
value include R.
Brandt, "Traits
"Traits of Character:
Character: A Conceptual
B. Brandt,
American Philosophical
Philosophical Quarterly
Conceptual Analysis," American
Quarterly 7
(1970): 23-37; W. K. Frankena,
"Pritchard and
and the Ethics of Virtue," Monist
(1970): 1-17;
(1970):
Frankena, "Pritchard
Monist 54 (1970):
Edmund Pincoffs, "Quandary
"Quandary Ethics," Mind
Mind 80 (1971):
(1971): 552-71;
552-7 1; and
and J.
0. Urmson, "Aristotle's
"Aristotle's
J. O.
Doctrine of the Mean,"
Quarterly 10
10 (1973):
(1973): 223-30. As to books, one
Mean," American
American Philosophical
Philosophical Quarterly
might mention Milton Mayeroff's
On Caring
Mayeroffs On
York: Harper
Harper &
Caring (New
(New York:
& Row, 1971).
1971).
3. See Pincoffs and
and my own attempt
attempt in On
OnJustifying
Justifying MoralJudgments
Moral Judgments (London:
(London: Routledge &
&
Kegan
York: Humanities Press, 1973).
1973).
Kegan Paul;
Paul; New
New York:
110
110
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reasons for regretting the general neglect of
of virtue in modern
will offer some reasons
moral philosophy and some illustrations
illustrations of
of the ways in which its employmoral
ment can be illuminating. Because I hope to persuade by adducing a wide
of arguments,
arguments, however, none of
of the specific arguments
arguments taken
taken alone
variety of
are each suggestive enough, I think, so
will be very fully developed. But they are
adequate support for my thesis: that the
that taken together they will be adequate
of the concept of
of virtue, at least to the'
the level of
of
philosophical development of
of value and obligation, is a
sophistication we possess for the central concepts of
of considerable
considerable importance.
importance.
matter of
The explanation
explanation of
of the modern neglect of
of virtue is no doubt complex,
The
factors must be largely responsible. First, it is commonplace to
but three factors
of characterizing
characterizing "the good person"
person"
observe that there can hardly be any way of
reference to some logically prior
prior notion of
of good per se. And this
without reference
point is made more emphatic when deontologists admit, as they sometimes
are parasitic
parasitic on at least some "thin
"thin
explicitly do, that even their theories are
theory" of
of the good.4
good. 4 On the other hand, the concepts of value and
and duty do
theory"
parasitic on the concept of virtue, and
and so virtue may
not seem to be similarly parasitic
treated as
as derivative.
derivative.
plausibly be treated
Seaond,
remarked that the question of
of a person's
person's moral
moral characcharacSecond, it may be remarked
approached via questions of
of the worth of the things he or she
ter is typically approached
(or is disposed to do) and
and the motives and
and intentions behind those acts.
does (or
Thus, matters
matters of
of moral
moral character
character seem not only dependent upon but exhausThus,
tively definable
definable in the language
language of act morality.
neutral
as commitment to normatively neutral
Third, it may be noted that as
virtue. It is
moral theorizing has
has grown, so too has
has neglect of the concept of virtue.
moral
accurate estimate of their philosophic
no accident
(and surely not due to an accurate
accident (and
are so widely unused.5
value) that large
large chunks of Aristotle's Ethics
Ethics are
unused. 5 For there,
value)
normaas
preliminaries, normaas in seemingly all
analyses of virtue which go beyond preliminaries,
all analyses
avoided.
abound-indeed, cannot be avoided.
judgments abound-indeed,
tive judgments
an occasional
occasional sense of regret
Philosophers are
are not without an
regret for this nePhilosophers
application of
are, for
glect 'of
for example, many times in the application
of virtue.
virtue. There are,
first
are of the first
character are
moral character
matters of moral
principlfs to practice when matters
principles
has been done, or
importance-times when the issue is not how much harm
importance-times
harm has
the value
nature of the offending
value of excusing the wrongdoer, or the voluntary nature
indicated by the behavior
sort of character
character indicated
behavior,
behavior
rather whether the sort
behavior, but rather
"wrongful" conduct
that the "wrongful"
ideal-so that
is "acceptable"
not-perhaps even ideal-so
"acceptable"or not-perhaps
unavoidable defect of it. Oedipus, on a strictly
must be seen simply as
as an
an unavoidable
didn't know when
fool who didn't
like an
an arrogant
arrogant fool
looks like
utilitarian analysis,
utilitarian
analysis, merely looks
heroes (pathetic,
fools are
are not tragic
to stop asking
perhaps,
(pathetic, perhaps,
tragic heroes
asking questions. But fools
that Sophocles must
safe to say that
and it is safe
classical sense), and
but not tragic
tragic in the classical
that tragedies
human excellence that
tragedies
sort of human
that Oedipus possessed
possessed the sort
have
have felt
felt that
destruction.
are
contains the seeds of its own destruction.
are made
of-the excellence which contains
made of-the
1971),
Mass.: Harvard
Harvard University Press, 1971),
ofJustice
(Cambridge, Mass.:
4. See John
Justice (Cambridge,
Theoryof
John Rawls, A Theory
pp
pp.. 395-99.
5. II think
think of books
books 3.
3. 6-4,
and 9.
5.
6-4, 6, 8,
8, and
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The pursuit of such excellence may bring down whole houses, but it is not
behavior of a fool or a knave.
important
like the behavior
knave. We miss something very important
just like
about
leads us only in the direction of the concluabout it when our moral
moral theory leads
sion that it is.
Further, the sense that act
heart of
act theory sometimes fails
fails to get to the heart
Further,
things is generated when
when one moves over from third-person
things
third-person talk to
first-person
expressions about
about moral
moral worth. People often try to make
first-person expressions
make excepfor themselves in practice.
practice. And this is part
part of what seems so properly
properly
tions for
self-corrective
theories which focus
focus on universalization
universalization principrinciself-corrective about
about moral
moral theories
for
that a part
ples. But it is also
also the case that
part of the tendency to make
make exceptions for
oneself is simply the wrongheaded
reasonable concern:
concern:
wrongheaded outgrowth of a very reasonable
fundamental to me is not whether I have
have done the right
right
that often what is fundamental
act was,
was,
person-not what my act
thing, but whether I am, at bottom, a good person-not
but whether it was an
am
an index to my character.
character. If I am
am satisfied
satisfied that I am
fundamentally a good person, then it is hard
not to think I ought to be
fundamentally
hard for me not
excused, because I will regard
regard my wrongful acts
acts either as
as necessary
necessary evils or as
as
blunders, mistakes
mistakes essentially out of character.
blunders,
character. And if I am
am dealt with solely in
terms
acts-their nature
and consequences-it
consequences-it will be hard
hard for
terms of my acts-their
nature and
for me not
to feel that that
point. 6 Self-esteem is very often the
that is somehow beside the point.6
crux of the matter
matter in evaluations
evaluations of one's own conduct. And self-esteem is not
built entirely on estimates of the value
value or dutifulness of one's performance.
performance.
No
matter how many successes some people have, they still feel they "are"
No matter
"are"
failures; no matter
matter how many lies some people tell, they still feel they "are"
"are"
failures;
fundamentally honest. Moral
Moral theorizing which ignores
this-as act
act
fundamentally
ignores or slights this-as
do-is very often beside the point in concrete moral
moral situasituatheory tends to do-is
tions.
Thus,
virtue can be an
Thus, the lack
lack of a developed theory of virtue
an embarrassment,
embarrassment,
and its lack
have reels
and
lack in modern moral
moral philosophy is a cause for regret.
reels
regret. We have
of analysis
fact-value distinction, the sources
and nature
sources and
nature of obligation,
analysis on the fact-value
of moral responsibility.
concept of
and the , concept
responsibility. But comparably
detailed
comparably detailed
ancient philosophers-on
accounts-which go beyond the work
accounts-which
work of ancient
philosophers-on the concepts of huqian
hurpan excellence, on ideals, on the good person are
are in notably short
short
as I have mentioned, some powerful reasons
supply. There are,
reasons underlying
are, as
this fact,
fact, so it will not do much good to simply point out a few places
places where it
causes discomfort.
discomfort. I want, therefore,
causes
therefore, to present an
an array
array of examples which,
taken
taken together, do two things:
things: (0)
unfortunate consequences
(a) indicate that the unfortunate
are too widespread
widespread in moral
of the neglect of virtue
virtue are
moral theory to be justifiably
justifiably
ignored
and (b)
(b) indicate that
that considerations
considerations of moral
moral character
character are
are more
ignored and
fundamental,
fundamental, theoretically, than
than is typically supposed. Thus, the arguments
arguments
to follow will, I hope, not only blunt the force
force of the
the. reasons
reasons behind the
"Quandary Ethics"
similar point at pp. 558-59. His whole article
article is an
an
6. Pincoffs's
Pincoffs's "Quandary
Ethics" makes
makes a similar
another source of the neglect of virtue:
argument
assumption that the subject
subject
virtue: the modern assumption
argument for
for another
matter
and help in the resolution
matter of ethics is fundamentally
fundamentally moralproblems,
moral problems, i.e.,
i.e., the analysis of and
resolution of
morally
argues, generates
generates a tendency to slight agent
morally problematic
problematic situations. This focus, he argues,
morality.
morality.
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as a
reinstating it as
neglect of virtue
virtue but constitute a coherent apology for
for reinstating
fundamental concept in moral
theorizing.
moral theorizing.
fundamental
1.
1.

PERSON
ON DEFINING
DEFINING THE
THE GOOD PERSON

The first
first such line of argument
peculiarities in the notion
argument concerns some peculiarities
of a good person.
person. It has
that one's self-concept (whether
has already
already been noted that
of oneself as
bad person)
person) is not derived
derived solely from
from a tabulation
tabulation of
as a good or a bad
one's performances
performances (e.g., I lie more often than
than I tell the truth;
truth; therefore
therefore I am
balance, I do
a liar)
liar) or even a tabulation
and intentions (e.g., On balance,
tabulation of motives and
from malicious
malicious intent than otherthings more often for ignoble motives or from
person). But it may be felt that this is merely
therefore I am not a good person).
wise; therefore
all
a psychological fact
fact about
and that we all
about the way people judge themselves and
tabulations
acknowledge,
force of such tabulations
logical force
acknowledge, when we judge others, the logical
toward assessments
an
assessments of character.
character. After all, how else can we possibly get an
toward
that
index of a person's
person's character?
(objectively) conclude that
character?And how could one (objectively)
a person
person who typically lied-in
lied-in all
acted
situations-or who typically acted
all sorts
sorts of
of situations-or
character?
from base motives or malicious
malicious intent was not deficient in character?
from
regard to
I do not wish to claim that
that performance-particularly
performance-particularly with regard
an
irrelevant to assessments
character. Indeed, it is an
assessments of character.
and intent-is
intent-is irrelevant
motive and
and
acts, their
their values, motivations, and
important
focus on acts,
criterion. But the focus
important criterion.
are people whose
crucial. There are
relations to dutifulness, misses something crucial.
relations
saintly-who seem untouched by
good-even saintly-who
performance is consistently good-even
performance
and
ignoble purposes
purposes to the degree we have
have come to expect in our fellows, and
unreserved sense, "good
"good people." We will
whom we still will not call, in any unreserved
virtue is simply blind adheradhertheir virtue
not so describe them when we think that their
characfor one of Steinbeck's
ence to authority-training,
for example-or,
as for
Steinbeck's characexample-or, as
authority-training, for
lack of energy. Similarly, there are
are people whose
ters, merely due to a lack
bad-even malevolent-but
performance is consistently bad-even
malevolent-but who exhibit not just
performance
rather a tragically
tragically
regret, but rather
remorse
fact, and
remorse after
after the fact,
and surely not just regret,
accurate
makes us unable
unable to call them, in any unreself-perception which makes
accurate self-perception
served
people."7
served sense, "bad
"bad people."7
investigate. The best one
important thing to investigate.
Why this is so is surely an important
as to what must be
at present, is to make
can do, 'at
vague suggestions as
make some very vague
at
here: that what must count as
toward our
at stake
as much as
as performance
performance toward
stake here:
"good .person"
person" is the degree to which that
judgment that someone is a "good
bad-are closed to the
person's dispositions
dispositiollS to act-for
act-for the good or the bad-are
person's
and deliberation.
deliberation. We
changes which can be wrought through
through self-perception and
for "self-making"
"self-making"(or,
(or, less
must feel-with
feel-with the Greeks-that
Greeks-that the equipment for
a
of
and
be
as
result
accurately and to
opaquely, the ability to perceive
perceive accurately
changed as
This
is
is
a
element
of
human
moral
excellence.
experience)
central
moral
evidently
central
experience)
and I submit that we
an important
moral convictions, and
an
feature of our common moral
important feature
and justifying
have
like the expertise in explicating and
have not developed anything like
The Theory
features of this problem, see Adam Smith, The
analysis of some features
7. For a fascinating
fascinating analysis
Theory
passage to my
am indebted
Sentiments,pt. 2, sec. 3. I am
of Moral
Moral Sentiments,
indebted to Thomas Nagel for
for calling this passage
attention.
attention.
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(or disjustifying)
(or
for the familiar
familiar value
value and
and obligadisjustifying) it that we have developed for
tion questions we discuss.

2.
2.

ON DEFINING
PERFORMANCE
DEFINING STANDARDS
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE

We are
are similarly ill-equipped to develop any sustained
sustained and
and illuminating
standards of performance
account of standards
account
performance for
for moral
Preoccupied with
moral conduct. Preoccupied
justifiable or
questions raised
raised by attempts
attempts to decide what sorts
sorts of conduct are
are justifiable
required by duty, we have
have largely
required
largely ignored
ignored the uneliminable question of what
standards
performance are
standards of performance
are to be required.
required. The existence of a duty of care
care
toward others immediately raises
raises the question of how much care
toward
care is to be
taken. We need criteria
for deciding when someone has
has "done
taken.
criteria for
"done enough"
enough" to
fulfill
virtually nonexistent in
fulfill a given duty. Discussions of the problem are
are virtually
philosophy.8 One must turn instead
instead to the law for
for help.
philosophy.8
In tort law, the existence or nonexistence of a duty of care
care is a question
to be decided by the court. The requisite standard
standard of care
care is, however,
trier offact
g., the jury,
regarded
regarded as
as a separate
separate issue, and
and a question for
for the trier
of fact (e.
(e.g.,
notable that the standard
when there is one).
one). But it is notable
standard of care
care is to be arrived
arrived
model-usually the mythical "reasonable
at
at in terms
terms of an
an agent-theoretic
agent-theoretic model-usually
"reasonable
fact is not encouraged
for
man." The trier
man."
trier of fact
encouraged to consider what would be "best
"best for
everyone on balance,"
balance," or the extent of one's duty to do a duty. The question
is, rather,
standard of performance
performance might be expected of a reasonable
reasonable
rather, what standard
and is attending to its performance.
person who is aware
aware of the duty and
The law
performance. The
insists that the appropriate
appropriatestandard
standard does not depend on consequences (e.g.,
if the victim is injured,
injured, you didn't do enough; if not, you did do enough).
enough).
Nor
Nor does it depend on the satisfaction
satisfaction of some deontological
as
deontological principle such as
act reasonably. Instead,
act reasonably
a duty to act
from the
Instead, the duty to act
reasonably follows from
adoption of the ideal of reasonability. It is the ideal which determines
adoption
determines what is
and just in the context of a duty of care,
right and
fall where
care, let the consequences fall
they must.
Furthermore, this model itself is not chosen primarily
primarily on axiological
Furthermore,
axiological or
deontological grounds-though
buttressed by arguments
grounds-though admittedly it is buttressed
arguments for
its utility an?
an~dfor
for its compatibility with the requirements
requirements of procedural
procedural fairfairness. It is chosen primarily
primarily because the character-trait
reasonability is
character-trait of reasonability
itself regarded
as the measure
measure of what counts as
as good or dutiful conduct in
regarded as
this context. Good conduct, right,
right, just, and
and dutiful conduct, is defined
definedhere in
an agent-theoretic
for some other uses of the
terms
terms of an
agent-theoretic concept. Similarly for
reasonability standard
law: in determining what counts as
provocation,
reasonability
standard in the law:
as provocation,
when that
that is used as
and
murder; and
as a defense against
criminal charge
as murder;
against a criminal
charge such as
disfavor in
8. Moral
Moral philosophers
philosophers have often failed
failed to see this, no doubt because of the disfavor
for distinguishing analytically
which casuistry has been held and
and the philosopher's
philosopher's penchant for
analytically
are not sharply
at all.
all. Thus,
rid himself
things which are
practice at
sharply distinguishable in practice
Thus, one may rid
standards of performance
(philosophically) of the question of standards
(philosophically)
performance by first
first distinguishing that
that question from
for conduct and
existenceof a dury
from the one of the existence
and then consigning the
duty or a principle for
former to casuistry and
and assuming that moral
proceed-unmisled-by working
former
moral philosophy can proceed-unmisled-by
only on the latter.
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in determining what counts as
as a mistake
mistake (of either law or fact)
fact) which can be
used as
as a defense against
against charges
charges such as
as bigamy or theft.
theft.99
that the law has
Now it is not the case that
fallen into the only
Now
has simply fallen
plausible way of fixing
fixing standards
for conduct. There is at least one other
plausible
standards for
ideal-the "average
reasonabilideal-the
replaces that of reasonabil"averageperson"-which
person"-which occasionally replaces
for reasons
10 There are
ity, for
reasons which are
are too often obscure.
obscure.10
are significant
significant differdifferfor action
because it is clear
ences in these ideals, and
action
and because
clear that no moral
moral principle for
is complete without some specification
specification of a standard
standard of performance,
performance, the
detailed
place in
detailed analysis
ideals should have a central
central place
analysis of standard-setting
standard-setting ideals
moral
and I lay the blame
general
moral philosophy. It does not, however, and
blame on the general
neglect of the concept of virtue.
virtue.
In fairness,
fairness, two sorts
standards
sorts of objections to this argument
argument about
about standards
should probably be considered: first,
first, that axiological
and/or deontological
axiological and/or
deontological
considerations
after all;
considerations lie behind the selection of standard-setting
standard-setting criteria
criteria after
all;
and
and second, even on the assumption
practice, it ought to
assumption that this is not s'o
so in practice,
be so, and
and philosophers
have been quite right
philosophers have
right in refusing to fall
fall in line with
the existing practice.
and of
The
The answer
answer to both charges
charges must be that the concepts of good and
virtue are
related: one cannot get very far
far beyond a few crude
virtue
are reciprocally
reciprocallyrelated:
"behavioral
preferences" in defining what counts as
virtue and
"behavioralpreferences"
as a virtue
and what counts
as a vice without appeal
as
values in general.
11 But neither
appeal to consequences-to
consequences-to values
general.11
"thin theory"
can one get very far
far beyond what Rawls calls a "thin
theory" of good-a
bare
good-a bare
at
list of those things which are
are preconditions
preconditions for
for the existence of any goods at
all-without dealing with the question of standards.
standards. A thin theory of good is
all-without
radically
no moral
moral theory by itself because the "guidance"
"guidance" it gives is so radically
at
ambiguous
reasonably claim it gives no significant
ambiguous that one can reasonably
significant guidance
guidance at
all. Until disputes about
about what standards
are required
all.
performance are
standards of performance
required of one
about moral
are
fairly say that very little about
moral issues is settled.
are settled, one can fairly
Now surely the best-indeed,
best-indeed, perhaps,
perhaps, the only-way
standards
Now
only-way to set standards
for
for performance
performance is in terms
terms of some ideal
ideal for
for human
human conduct. Any attempt
attempt to
fix
standard axiologically
axiologically (in
(in terms of the values
various
fix a standard
values to be derived
derived from
from various
levels of performance)
run the risk
risk of itself being a rule or principle
principle for
performance) will run
for
conduct which requires
requires the specification
performance standard.
standard. Simispecification of a performance
larly
for the attempt to fix
fix standards
terms of a
larly for
standards deontologically (that
(that is, in terms
certain level).
here again
danger here
again is one of infinite
duty to perform
perform to a certain
level). The danger
9. Indeed, the whole theory of the law of crimes
crimes (who, when, and
and how to punish with the
public law responses
criminal law) seems to me to rest on an
an agent-theoretic
i.e., on
responses of the criminal
agent-theoretic basis, i.e.,
and unstable
unstable character
character traits.
a distinction between socially stable and
traits. But that
that is a very long
argument; see my paper
"Criminal Attempt and
and the Theory of
of the Law of Crimes,"
Crimes," Philosophy
argument;
paper "Criminal
Phi/osop"y
and
(1974): 262-94.
and Public
Public Affairs
Affairs 3 (1974):
262-94.
10. See the recent Supreme Court decision on pornography,
10.
pornography, Miller v. California,
California, 93 S.Ct.
2607 (1973),
(1973), in which the standards
standards for
2607
for determining the arousal
arousal of a "prurient
"prurient interest in sex,"
"patent offensiveness"
offensiveness" of the portrayal
and the presence of "serious
"serious literary,
portrayal of sex, and
literary, artistic,
the "patent
artistic,
political, or scientific value"
value" is to be that of the average
person applying contemporary
averageperson
contemporary community standards.
standards.
11. See, for
argument, chap. 9 of my book (n. 3 above).
11.
for the development of this line of argument,
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regress. The only way to avoid
form of a
avoid such a regress
regress is to specify-in
specify-in the form
perhaps-precisely what acts
fulfill the principle or
duty, perhaps-precisely
acts are
are required
required to fulfill
has not set a standard
duty "up
"up to standard."
standard." But then one has
standard at
at all
all which will
necessary flexibility in dealing with borderline
borderline or novel cases.
permit the necessary
inherent in the
Any student of the law will appreciate
appreciate that it is the flexibility inherent
reasonability standard
rationally to unreasonability
standard which allows the law to respond
respond rationally
foreseeable cases. And it is surely fair
fair to say that what is true of the writing of
foreseeable
also true
true of the formulation
principles: that no
laws in this regard
regard is also
formulation of moral
moral principles:
formulation specific enough for
formulation
for action-guidance
action-guidance will be adequate
adequate (without
performance) for
for the
case-by-case reformulation
terms of some standard
reformulation in terms
standard of performance)
variety of cases to which it will be expected to apply.
full variety
Thus the conclusion seems clear:
perforclear: the setting of standards
standards for performance is a central
central problem for moral
moral philosophy, and
and we have too long
neglected the development of the best tools for setting such standards-the
standards-the
concepts which cluster around
virtue.
around the notion of virtue.

3.
3.

ON
EXCUSES
ON EXCUSES

Equally interesting testimony to the usefulness of agent-theoretic
agent-theoretic concepts comes from
from a consideration
consideration of excusing conditions. Attempts to profor our excuse-practices
vide a general
general rationale
rationale for
excuse-practices in terms of axiological
axiological theory
and in terms
terms of voluntarism
voluntarism and
and moral
are well known. But
and
moral responsibility are
what is lacking
lacking in these accounts
is an
accounts (particularly
(particularly the deontological ones) is
an
appreciation of the perspicuousness provided
explicit appreciation
provided by a virtues-vices
virtues-vices approach
proach to the problem.
problem.
Our common moral
moral intuitions dictate that when I commit a crime in
ignorance (such
(such that it cannot even be said
said that I should, as
as a reasonable
ignorance
reasonable man,
have
have known what I was doing), or when I commit a crime under an extremity
of duress
duress no one could reasonably
reasonably be expected to endure, or when I am
swarmed by bees and, as
swarmed
brakes and
fatal traffic
traffic
as a reflex,
and cause a fatal
reflex, slam on the brakes
accident,t I have
am a man of
accident
have done nothing to damage
damage the judgment that I am
character. And, indeed, there appears
good character.
appears to be quite a general
general coincidence
between acts, however damaging
are "consodamaging or otherwise wrongful, which are
"consonant"
character and
and acts
nant" with good moral
moral character
for which we excuse our fellows
acts for
from
as an
an interesting line of investigation
investigation is a
from blame.
blame. What this suggests as
as the following:
following: Acts fully consonant with good moral
moral characprinciple such as
character are
are fully excusable, and, to the degree that an
an act
act is not so consonant, to
12
that degree
degree it is not excusable.
excusable. 12
12.
considered this line of argument
argument approvingly
approvingly in the general
general context of
\2 . R. B. Brandt
Brandt has considered
Review78 (1969):
(1969): 337-6\,
337-61, esp. pp. 353-58.
353-58. The
"A Utilitarian
Utilitarian Theory of Excuses," Philosophical
Philosophical Review
principle
an act
act is to be excused if it rkJes
doesnot
manifestsome
principle he suggests, however, is that
that an
not manifest
some defect
defectof
character
(p. 354).
354). I think this may be restrictive. We do not have to say that a person's
character (p.
person's character
character
is defective
rule out an
an excuse, because
act does not necessarily
necessarily manifest a
defective to rule
because one blameworthy act
"defect" (except relative
"defect"
relative to sainthood).
phrase "consonant
moral
sainthood). The more inclusive phrase
"consonant with good moral
character"is probably
charaFter"
probably better. For
For further
further relevant
relevant discussion from
from Brandt,
Brandt, see his "Blamewor"Blameworand Obligation"
Obligation" iIi
in Essays
in Moral
thiness and
Essays in
Moral Philosophy,
Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of
Washington
Washington Press, \958).
1958).
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Of course, one immediately wants to know what counts as
as good moral
moral
and what it means
character
means to say that an
character and
an act
act is consonant with it. The
current moral
poverty of current
moral theory to be of much help here
here is obvious. And this
shortcoming is to .be
regretted, not only because of the values
be regretted,
values of perspicuity
understanding of excuses through
which might be gained for the understanding
through this nealso because an
glected route, but also
an agent-theoretic
agent-theoretic account
account of excuses may not
an analysis
require an
freedom in anything like the metaphysical glory
require
analysis of human freedom
deontological accounts
for example, Aristotle's
Aristotle's analysis
deontological
accounts do. Consider, for
analysis of excusing conditions. In his description of the sorts of conduct generally
generally held to
makes reference
voluntariness, involuntarinesss,
be excusable, he makes
reference to voluntariness,
involuntarinesss, nonvoluntariness,
and the like.
matters is ultimately tied
voluntariness, and
like. But his account
account of such matters
freedom. The ultimate issue at
to questions of character,
character, not to questions of freedom.
at
stake,
therefore, is not whether an
free" but whether
stake, therefore,
an act
act was "metaphysically
"metaphysically free"
character. In such a context, talk
it was a product of good or bad
bad character.
talk of free
free
action
looks like an
action looks
an eliminable descriptive device, or at least one which does
generate the thickets of metaphysical argument
not generate
argument endemic to modern
philosophy.
I do not mean to suggest that agent-theory
here.
agent-theory can stand
stand on its own here.
certain traits
traits are
are regarded
Clearly, questions of why certain
regarded as
as excellent, why certain
certain
peformance are
standards
standards of peformance
are regarded
regarded as
and the general
as adequate,
adequate, and
general justifying
aims of punishment all
all will require
aims
require answers
theories of value
answers involving the theories
value
and obligation. But it seems unassailable
and
unassailable that the whole analysis
analysis of excuses
could be helped immensely by developing the lines suggested by agenttheory.
4.

ON RESCUE
VERSUS PREVENTIVE
PREVENTIVE ACTION13
ACTION 13
RESCUE VERSUS

A further
further need for a development of agent-theory comes from
from a consideration of certain
certain sorts
eration
sorts of rescue'cases.
rescue cases. These
These are
are the cases in which, for one
reason or another,
another, one must choose between the rescue
reason
rescue of those in imminent
and the prevention
danger and
prevention of such danger
future. Political
kidnappings
danger in the future.
Political kidnappings
are a Clear
clear example. It is obvious that a "hard-line"
are
"hard-line"approach-such
approach-such as
as the
taken
British government
has
taken
for
its
diplomats-is
eliminate
or at
has
for
the
to
diplomats-is
way
,
least minimize the practice.
practice. The British
British simply refuse to deal, ignoring
threats
and death against
threats of torture
torture and
kidnapped diplomat, on the
an already
against an
already kidnapped
ground that any other policy encourages
ground
future kidnappings.
encourages future
kidnappings. And indeed,
after
handling, in this manner,
manner, the kidnapping
kidnapping of a high-ranking
high-ranking diplomat
after handling,
had further
taken
taken by Argentinian
British have not had
further
Argentinian guerillas
guerillas in 1971, the British
problems
has been suggested from
problems of this kind. Similarly, it has
from time to time that
ransom money (i.e.,
banking laws be changed to make
make the obtaining of ransom
banking
untraceable
untraceable currencies
legal chancurrencies in sizable
sizable quantities)
quantities) impossible through legal
forms of kidnapnels, taking
taking the profit
profit out of, and
and thus eliminating, some forms
kidnapping.
are conceptually convincing as
clear
as to utility. It seems clear
Such proposals
proposals are
13. This section was suggested by Lewis H,
H. LaRue's
LaRue's "A Comment on Fried, Summers,
13.
and the Value of Life," Cornell
CornellLaw
57 (1972):
(1972): 621.
and
Law Review
Review 57
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that the possible1sacrifice
of the initial victims(s) by a refusal to deal, coupled
with a vigorous police effort to capture the culprits, will eliminate future
that the possible sacrifice of the initial victims(s) by a refusal to deal, coupled
attempts which are at all rationally conceived, whereas dealing-even if
with a vigorous police effort to capture the culprits, will eliminate future
capture and conviction eventually result-can only be a stimulus to future
attempts which are at all rationally conceived, whereas dealing-even if
attempts. Yet there is great resistance to taking the hard line on kidnap cases.
capture and conviction eventually result-can only be a stimulus to future
The United States cannot bring itself to do so, and it is doubtful the British
attempts. Yet there is great resistance to taking the hard line on kidnap cases.
would extend their policy for diplomats to citizens (say, in an airline hijackThe United States cannot bring itself to do so, and it is doubtful the British
ing).
would extend their policy for diplomats to citizens (say, in an airline hijackSimilar dilemmas occur in accident cases. We (and mineowners) will
ing).
typically spare no expense to rescue trapped miners but hedge at spending
Similar dilemmas occur in accident cases. We (and mineowners) will
the same money taking preventive measures-even if it is demonstrable that
typically spare no expense to rescue trapped miners but hedge at spending
the preventive action maximizes the number of lives saved. Battlefield examthe same money taking preventive measures-even if it is demonstrable that
ples put the same problem in a more extreme form: diving a submarine while
the preventive action maximizes the number of lives saved. Battlefield examcrew members are on deck; deciding whether to try to rescue an injured
ples put the same problem in a more extreme form: diving a submarine while
soldier in no-man's-land. Rationality, here, seems again to dictate a "hardcrew members are on deck; deciding whether to try to rescue an injured
line" approach, just as in the kidnapping cases. Maximize the number of lives
soldier in no-man's-land. Rationality, here, seems again to dictate a "hardto be saved; and if that means-for economic or other reasons-that one
line" approach, just as in the kidnapping cases. Maximize the number of lives
cannot both rescue and prevent, then prevent.
to be saved; and if that means-for economic or other reasons-that one
What discussions of such problems typically ignore is the force of
cannot both rescue and prevent, then prevent.
agent-morality considerations in assessing what the rational course of action
What discussions of such problems typically ignore is the force of
must be. As LaRue puts it, "The values we hold ... can be used for our own
agent-morality considerations in assessing what the rational course of action
self-definitions-to give a particular shape and meaning to our life. Furthermust be. As LaRue puts it, "The values we hold . . . can be used for our own
more, they can be used to represent the type of society in which we wish to
self-definitions-to give a particular shape and meaning to our life. Furtherlive. If we return to the combat ... example, we might note that men in such
more, they can be used to represent the type of society in which we wish to
a plight might think it important to live on a 'band of brothers' principle. "14 I
live. If we return to the combat . . . example, we might note that men in such
would put the same point by noting that we have (rationally defensible)
a plight might think it important to live on a 'band of brothers' principle."'14 I
worries about the sort of moral character represented by people who propose
would put the same point by noting that we have (rationally defensible)
to stand pat and let present victims die for the sake of future possibilities.
worries about the sort of moral character represented by people who propose
One who can fail to respond to the call for help is not quite the same sort of
to stand pat and let present victims die for the sake of future possibilities.
character as one who can fail to maximize prevention.
One who can fail to respond to the call for help is not quite the same sort of
It would be interesting to get to the bottom of this-that is, to be able to
character as one who can fail to maximize prevention.
say just wlpt character traits are at issue here and why. There is no guaranIt would be interesting to get to the bottom of this-that is, to be able to
tee, of course, that we would ultimately be able to defend current practice
say just wheatcharacter traits are at issue here and why. There is no guaranover the "hard-line" approach. But it is clear that the investigation of this
tee, of course, that we would ultimately be able to defend current practice
whole nest of problems needs an emphasis on the concept of virtue-even if
over the "hard-line" approach. But it is clear that the investigation of this
what we justify as virtues are those traits which have "utility" or value. The
whole nest of problems needs an emphasis on the concept of virtue-even if
neglect of virtue here-whether or not it is ultimately the primary or primiwhat we justify as virtues are those traits which have "utility" or15value. The
tive moral concept-distorts our understanding of the problem.
neglect of virtue here-whether or not it is ultimately the primary or primitive
our understanding of the problem.15
5. moral concept-distorts
ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

5.

As another illustration
of the illumination to be gained from agentON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

14.
p. 630.illustration of the illumination to be gained from agentAsIbid.,
another
15. The same may be said of some classic problems of utilitarian theory. Why should we
refrain
punishing
14.from
Ibid.,
p. 630. the innocent if great benefit is to be gained from it? Why should we keep
a promise
when
nothing
is tosaid
be of
gained
lost) problems
from doing
These and
similar
problems
utilitarian
we
15. The
same
may be
some(or
classic
ofso?
theory.
Why
should are
refrain greatly
from punishing
theoninnocent
if greatifbenefit
is to be gained
it? Why
should
we keep
helped
by a focus
virtues-even
one eventually
were tofrom
justify
the list
of virtues
in a
a promise when
utilitarian
way. nothing is to be gained (or lost) from doing so? These and similar problems are
helped greatly by a focus on virtues-even if one eventually were to justify the list of virtues in a
utilitarian way.
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19 problem
The Neglect
of justification
Virtue
theory, consider 1the
of the
of civil disobedience. Typical analyses treat the question as one of determining the existence and extent
of the justification of civil disobedience. Typitheory, consider the
of one's obligation to problem
obey the law. They
focus on notions of legitimacy and
cal analyses treat the question as one of determining the existence and extent
consent to a social contract as sources of obligation. Such an approach is the
of one's obligation to obey the law. They focus on notions of legitimacy and
natural one to take. Given the generally deontological character of law, it
consent to a social contract as sources of obligation. Such an approach is the
does seem an obvious thing to do to start with the question of an obligation to
natural one to take. Given the generally deontological character of law, it
obey. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are well known and
does seem an obvious thing to do to start with the question of an obligation to
need not be recited here. My purpose is not to challenge its fundamental
obey. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are well known and
soundness but to suggest an additional line of analysis which helps to round it
need not be recited here. My purpose is not to challenge its fundamental
out-and to give rational support to some commonsense reactions to civil
soundness but to suggest an additional line of analysis which helps to round it
disobedience.
out-and to give rational support to some commonsense reactions to civil
Consider the line of argument in the Crito where the Laws are
disobedience.
personified and given arguments against the escape Crito proposes for SocConsider the line of argument in the Crito where the Laws are
rates. The Laws present themselves as having had a quasi-parental function.
personified and given arguments against the escape Crito proposes for SocThey assert the existence of an obligation on Socrates, to be sure. The sour.ce
rates. The Laws present themselves as having had a quasi-parental function.
of the obligation is understood to be a bargain or contract which Socrates has
They assert the existence of an obligation on Socrates, to be sure. The source
at least tacitly accepted by being-and remaining-an Athenian citizen. But
of the obligation is understood to be a bargain or contract which Socrates has
the argument has other strands as well: the Laws have been good to Socrates.
at least tacitly accepted by being-and remaining-an Athenian citizen. But
In a real sense they made him and have kept him from many sorts of harm
the argument has other strands as well: the Laws have been good to Socrates.
which might have befallen him but for their presence. In short, the implicit
In a real sense they madehim and have kept him from many sorts of harm
suggestion is that the nurture, protection, and benefits they have provided
which might have befallen him but for their presence. In short, the implicit
-their actions on his behalf, if you like-are "worth something." These
suggestion is that the nurture, protection, and benefits they have provided
benefits provide an occasion appropriate for gratitude on Socrates' part, and the
-their actions on his behalf, if you like-are "worth something." These
suggestion is clear that disobedience would be inconsistent with this fact
benefits provide an occasionappropriate
for gratitude on Socrates' part, and the
-indeed, that it would be somehow an act of ingratitude.
suggestion is clear that disobedience would be inconsistent with this fact
Now say what you will about the "perfect right" one may have to do
-indeed, that it would be somehow an act of ingratitude.
something, or the utility of certain tactics and the way they work for a greater
Now say what you will about the "perfect right" one may have to do
balance of good over evil, the sort of person who is doing the act has a
something, or the utility of certain tactics and the way they work for a greater
significant impact on how we regard the act morally. This is often ridiculed
balance of good over evil, the sort of person who is doing the act has a
as a silly obsession with style; and it is used to manipulate
us by way of
significant impact on how we regard the act morally. This is often ridiculed
"image-making" techniques. But it is a deeper issue than that. The right
as a silly obsession with style; and it is used to manipulate us by way of
course of action, as existentialists are so fond of pointing out, is very often
"image-making"techniques. But it is a deeper issue than that. The right
prospectively ambiguous. One simply has to act and take the consequences of
course of action, as existentialists are so fond of pointing out, is very often
responsibility applied by hindsight. Now in these situations, we quite
prospectively ambiguous. One simply has to act and take the consequences of
reasonably are concerned with the moral character of the agent and the way
responsibility applied by hindsight. Now in these situations, we quite
in which his acts are an index to it. For ultimately we may have to settle the
reasonably are concerned with the moral character of the agent and the way
question of justice in terms of the standards set by the actions of people of
in which his acts are an index to it. For ultimately we may have to settle the
good moral character. Insofar as insensitivity, ingratitude, and lack of hospiquestion of justice in terms of the standards set by the actions of people of
tality are felt to be parts of moral character, their presence or absence in the
good moral character. Insofar as insensitivity, ingratitude, and lack of hospiactions of the civilly disobedient will be a matter of concern.
tality are felt to be parts of moral character, their presence or absence in the
Surely this line of investigation organizes nicely what we find so unsetactions of the civilly disobedient will be a matter of concern.
tling about some sorts of disobedience (even, perhaps, some sorts of the
Surely this line of investigation organizes nicely what we find so unsetcarefully circumscribed civil disobedience defined
by Rawls)16 and not about
tling about some sorts of disobedience (even, perhaps, some sorts of the
other sorts: some disobedience shows no awareness of the appropriateness of
carefully circumscribed civil disobedience defined by Rawls)16and not about
16.sorts:
See John
Rawls,
"The Justification
Civil
Disobedience,"
in Law
and Philosophy, ed.
other
some
disobedience
showsofno
of the
awareness
of
appropriateness
E. A. Kent (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1970), pp. 343-54.
16. See John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Law and Philosophy,ed.
E. A. Kent (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 343-54.
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sort of gratitude
gratitude at
at all
all to one's fellows for
creation and
and maintenance
any sort
for the creation
maintenance of
those parts
parts of the law which do promote
promote justice. It is not that one can claim such
an obligation (for
gratitude as
as an
(for that is also
also inappropriate).
inappropriate). It is merely that one
gratitude
senses something akin
akin to a violation of the conventions of hospitality in such
ingratitude. I submit that something like this sense of inappropriateness
inappropriateness is
ingratitude.
name of however long
what is (rationally)
(rationally) unsettling about
about acts
acts which, in the name
a list of injustices, seem not so much blind as
as insensitive to what justice
there is. And similarly, it is the apparent
apparent presence
presence of such sensitivity which
can render
render even the most disruptive acts
acts of civil disobedience (rationally)
(rationally)
reassuring.
reassuring.

6.

ON TORTURE,
AND STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC BOMBING
BOMBING
TORTURE, TERRORISM,
TERRORISM, AND

There is a commonly felt reluctance,
reluctance, in what might be called popular
popular
moral sentiment, to treat
treat with equal harshness
harshness wrongs done indirectly and
moral
and
personally. The reluctance
reluctance finds
finds expression in many ways. On
wrongs done personally.
machine-guns a group of passive, unarmed
unarmed
the one hand, the soldier who machine-guns
civilians is cause for
for national
national turmoil;
turmoil; the episode is called a massacre.
massacre. On the
other hand, the pilot who drops
village he knows
drops bombs to obliterate a village
contains mostly civilians is not a cause for
turmoil; his act
for such turmoil;
act is called the
intolerable policy or an
inevitable consequence of modem warresult of an
an intolerable
an inevitable
fare. Similarly, the person
another to commit a crime is typically
fare.
person who solicits another
not subject to as
as severe a penalty as
as the one who actually
actually commits the
crime-especially
first degree or a
crime-especially if the crime involved is a felony of the first
17
capital
offense.17
capital offense.
inflicted by
A further
further example is the typical reaction
reaction to the suffering inflicted
torture or terrorism
terrorism as
as opposed to similar suffering produced by "uncivilized"
warfare. The revulsion
revulsion felt toward
toward the interrogator
civilized" warfare.
interrogator who methodically inflicts
bums upon a victim:
victimis
revulsion
inflicts burns
is overwhelming in a way that the revulsion
toward the pilot dropping napalm
not-at least
least not typically. People speak
napalm is not-at
toward
speak
of the "barbaric"
terrorists (indiscriminate
"barbaric"methods of terrorists
(indiscriminate assassinations,
assassinations, the
placing ~f
of bombs in public places, skyjackings)
skyjackings) when, of course, they know
warfare necessarily results
as much if not
"civilized" warfare
very well that
t~at "civilized"
results in just as
more indiscriminate
more
indiscriminate killing.
killing.
Moralists
respond to these common sentiments by arguing
Moralists often respond
arguing that
are irrational.
irrational. Surely the person
as causally
they are
killer is every bit as
person who hires
hires a killer
responsible
relevant to moral
for the murder,
moral culpability, as
as the
responsible for
murder, in a sense relevant
one who pulls the trigger.
trigger. Surely the one who solicits murder
murder intends it to
happen
as fully as
as the murderer
murderer does. What ground
ground is there, then, for
happen just as
for
versus the foot
grading the two crimes differently?
differently? Similarly with the flyer versus
grading
from fifty or fifty
soldier. Killing civilians is killing civilians, whether from
on Criminal
CriminalLaw
17.
Handbook on
Law (Saint Paul,
Jr., Handbook
LaFave and
and Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
17. See Wayne R. LaFave
Code
415-16. The American
1972), pp. 415-16.
Co., 1972),
American Law Institute's
Institute's Model
Model Penal
Penal Code
Minn.: West Publishing Co.,
for solicitation
and commission equal in most cases but
solicitation and
5.05(1) recommends
making the penalties
penalties for
recommends making
capital
and capital
first-degree felonies and
solicitation in the case of first-degree
still recommends
recommends lighter penalties for
for solicitation
crimes.
crimes.
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thousand feet.
for
ground is there
there for
thousand
feet. If both know
know what they are
are doing, what ground
as for the supposed
horrible than the other?
holding one act
act to be more horrible
other? And as
barbarity of torture
torture and
barbarity
and terrorism
terrorism as
as military methods, is it not sheer sophistmorally superior
ry which allows one to feel morally
superior as
as long as
as the methods he uses
(and
produce just as
internaas much human suffering)
are sanctioned
sanctioned by interna(and which produce
suffering) are
tional conventions?
conventions?
tional
What I have to say about
popular moral
moral
about this apparent
apparent conflict between popular
sentiment and
reflective moral
moral judgments is difficult to put in a way which
and reflective
does not lead
misunderstandings, but basically
basically it is that there
there is a kernel
kernel of
lead to misunderstandings,
rationality
reluctance to identify, morally, the one who does a wrong
rationality in the reluctance
"indirectly,"
and
"indirectly," "impersonally,"
"impersonally," with one whose wrongdoing is very direct and
personal. I am
former is always (or
less
(or ever)
ever) less
very personal.
am not at all
all sure
sure that the former
culpable than
than the latter.
latter. I simply want to advance
advance some considerations
considerations which
an equal footing,
are not plausibly regarded
as on an
suggest that the two are
regarded as
morally.
morally.
The considerations
refer all
relate to what might be called
considerations to which I refer
all relate
"personal
"awareness"
"personaldistance"-that
distance"-that is, to the "distance"
"distance"in space, time, or "awareness"
person and
temporal distance
another. Spatial
and temporal
distance need
between one person
and another.
Spatial distance and
as they affect what I
no explanation
explanation and
and figure
figure in what follows only insofar
insofar as
have called distance
distance in "awareness."
"awareness."A detailed
detailed analysis
analysis is not possible here,
purposes it will suffice to mention just two aspects
"awarebut for
for present purposes
aspects of "awaredistance and
and intendistancing" which are
are of moral
moral importance:
ness distancing"
importance: cognitive distance
distance.'8IS
tional distance.
mean the sort
intellectual "pullback"
"pullback"which
By 'cognitive distance'
distance' I mean
sort of intellectual
allows one to know what is going on in a "general"
forced
"general"way without being forced
"details." By 'intentional
'intentional distance'
distance' I mean the sort of intellecto attend
attend to the "details."
tual pullback
pullback which allows one to define
for example,
tual
define what is being done as, for
solving a complex problem
problem rather
rather than
than solving a complex problem which will
permit the development of a weapons system.
Personal distance in both senses is related
moral character
character in imporPersonal
related to moral
imporunable to do certain
tant ways. Some people are
are simply unable
certain things without the
requisite sort and
personal distance. Anesthesia and
and the sheets
and amount
amount of personal
requisite
for the surgeon's
patient's body have important
which d~ape
functions for
surgeon's
drape a patient's
important functions
for the patient's
as for
welfare. Eichmann, who could bring himself
patient's welfare.
as well as
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